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With the ascent of modern epidemiology in the Twentieth Century came a new standard model of
prediction in public health and clinical medicine. In this article, we describe the structure of the model.
The standard model uses epidemiological measuresdmost commonly, risk measuresdto predict out-
comes (prognosis) and effect sizes (treatment) in a patient population that can then be transformed into
probabilities for individual patients. In the first step, a risk measure in a study population is generalized or
extrapolated to a target population. In the second step, the risk measure is particularized or transformed
to yield probabilistic information relevant to a patient from the target population. Hence, we call the
approach the Risk GeneralizationeParticularization (Risk GP) Model. There are serious problems at both
stages, especially with the extent to which the required assumptions will hold and the extent to which
we have evidence for the assumptions. Given that there are other models of prediction that use different
assumptions, we should not inflexibly commit ourselves to one standard model. Instead, model pluralism
should be standard in medical prediction.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
Predictions are central to medical practice. Doctors want to
know what will happen to the patient in the future given their
present condition (prognosis), and how treatment or prevention
might alter the natural course of events (intervention). But is there
a standard model of prediction in medicine, a dominant approach
in which trainees are schooled and according to which doctors
practice? What we are after is a prediction scheme similar to other
models of prediction in the philosophy of science, the most classic
and well-known of which is the Deductive-Nomological Model (DN
Model) of Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (Hempel &
Oppenheim, 1948).1tion; EBM, evidence-based
se; ES, effect size; RR, relative
.
J. Fuller).
ore recently in the work of
ach uses directed graphical
ulting from a targeted inter-Such an idealization is not to be found in medical textbooks. In
fact, textbooks tend not to use the term ‘prediction’ to label a major
category of clinical inference, but instead divide inferential activ-
ities into the traditional medical categories of diagnosis, prognosis,
therapy and harm (Guyatt, Rennie, Meade, & Cook, 2008). Yet
prognostic, therapeutic and harm-related inferences typically
involve predictions, hypotheses about future outcomes. Even
diagnosis can be conceptualized as a predictive activity; clinical
textbooks speak of “clinical prediction rules” for diagnosis and the
“positive predictive value” of a diagnostic test (Guyatt et al., 2008,
pp. 491e505; Fuller, Sankar, & Upshur, 2013, pp. 580). Diagnosis is
predictive in the wider sense of inferring an outcome that is not
definitively known (i.e. the presence of a particular disease). It will
be profitable to examine the shared structure of these distinct types
of clinical inference.
An important clue to the existence of a standard model is
that there seems to be a common target of several critiques of
medical prediction, some of which will be explored in Sections 4
through 6. However, the received model lacks an explicit phil-
osophical reconstructiondor a reconstruction of any sort, for
that matter. Without a clear representation, it remains a nebu-
lous target.
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Particularization (Risk GP) Model, the standard model of prediction
in medicine. Risk GP is standard in that it represents the dominant
prescriptivemodel in contemporary practice (the gold standard), as
well as the model that many practitioners implicitly rely upon
when making evidence-based decisions. Risk GP is an epidemio-
logical model, relying centrally on aggregate outcomes in pop-
ulations. Like the science of epidemiology, the model is relatively
new when framed against the long history of medicine, although
rational approaches to prediction have been around since at least
the time of Hippocrates (460-370 BCE). The Risk GP Model actually
consists of two inferences in series: a generalization of a risk mea-
sure from a study population to a target patient population of in-
terest; and a particularization, a transformation of this measure to
yield probabilistic information about a patient within the target
population.
There are well-known problems at both stages. Most worry-
ingly, the necessary assumptions for generalization and particula-
rization may not hold widely, and even when they do hold, we
might not have evidence to warrant them. These problems are not
an inevitable challenge for clinical practice, or even for epidemio-
logical predictions, but are peculiar to the Risk GPModel. Of course,
most models are imperfect, and their ideal assumptions will
sometimes fail to represent reality. Those circumstances demand
flexibility; we should not commit ourselves to a one-model-fits-all
approach, but should be model pluralists instead.3 Narrow prediction claims include subjunctive conditionals, or ‘counterfactuals’
(‘if T, then O’); specifically, counterfactuals in which the consequent refers to some
future outcome or event. In order to decide on a course of action, especially when
multiple alternative courses are open, physicians must often predict what will2. Models of prediction in historical perspective
A few distinctions will be useful upfront. Alex Broadbent iden-
tifies a “process/product” ambiguity in the concepts of prediction.
He distinguishes two senses of the term: prediction as a claim, and
prediction as an activity (2013, pp. 86, 89e93). The first sense of
‘prediction’ is a claim or hypothesis, such as: ‘it will rain tomorrow’.
The second sense of ‘prediction’ is an activity or argument, such as:
‘followingmany previous weeks like this one it rained the next day;
therefore, it will rain tomorrow’. Prediction activities are inferences
involving prediction claims.
In cases like the meteorological prediction just mentioned,
prediction activities are inferences with a prediction claim, a def-
inite forecast, as their conclusion. We can call these prediction
activities predictive inferences to distinguish them from prediction
activities that do not have a definite prediction claim as their
conclusion. For instance, take the inference: ‘on 60% of previous
weeks like this one it rained the next day; therefore, the proba-
bility that it will rain tomorrow is 60%’. The conclusion is not a
prediction claim; in asserting it, we are not placing a bet or
committing ourselves to the occurrence of some future event. If
instead it was clear skies without any approaching storm fronts,
the meteorologist would conclude that the probability of rain is
low, which is obviously not a prediction that it will rain tomorrow.
Yet we might still want to call this statistical inference a ‘prediction
activity’ because the conclusion tells us the probability of a pre-
diction claim.2
As previously alluded, there are at least two, non-exclusive types
of prediction claims in natural language and medical discourse. The
more inclusive type encompasses all hypotheses about unknown
(unobserved) events or outcomes. It includes diagnostic hypothe-
ses like: ‘the patient has heart disease’. Meanwhile, the less2 Predictive inferences in medicine are typically also ‘probabilistic’ in that they
warrant the definite prediction claim inductively. The essential difference is that a
predictive inference concludes that the outcome or event will occur, while this
statistical inference merely derives the probability of its occurrence.inclusive type of prediction claim is a subtype of the former, and
includes only hypotheses about the future (e.g. ‘the patient will
experience a cardiovascular disease event over the next ten years’).
In these cases, the outcomes are unknown specifically because they
have not yet occurred (Broadbent calls this less inclusive type
“narrow prediction” (2013, pp. 93)). As we will see, the standard
model can account for predictions in the broader sense. But since
prognostic and therapeutic predictions are usually predictions in
the narrow sense (they are hypotheses about what will happen in
the future to the patient), narrow predictions will be our main
focus.3
An informative prediction scheme would model both the pre-
diction claims and the associated prediction activities in a given
field. The DN Model (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948) provides a good
illustration. Given a physical phenomenon to be explained (the
explanandum), we supply the laws of nature and particular facts
that jointly entail it (the explanans). To explain why an object is
accelerating at a particular rate of 1/2 m/s2, we can deduce the rate
from Newton’s Second Law and some initial conditions:
Acceleration = Force/Mass
Force = 1 N, Mass = 2 kg
Acceleration = 1/2 m/s2
In the DN scheme, explanation and prediction are symmetrical
activities; a prediction is an explanation in which the explanans
(above the line) is known but the explanandum (below the line) is
not. So the DN Model is also a model of prediction in the wide
sense. The entire model represents a prediction activity, while the
conclusion represents a prediction claim about an unknown
variable.
Unfortunately, the DN Model is of limited use in characterizing
modernmedical prediction.4 Few universal laws are used in clinical
practice, and there is no unifying theory akin to Newton’s Laws. Yet
the absence of any grand theory in contemporary medicine is
peculiar from a historical perspective. The miasma and contagion
theories of disease persisted well into the Nineteenth Century
(Gillies, 2005), and from Ancient Greek medicine until the Re-
naissance, the Hippocratic Theory of the Four Humours, a para-
digmatic example of a unifying medical theory, provided a
theoretical basis for medicine (Duffin, 2010, pp. 42e45).
In the canonical interpretation of humoural theory, the balance
of four bodily fluidsdblood, phlegm, black bile and yellow
bileddetermines a person’s state of health or disease. When each
of the four humours is in equilibrium, the person is healthy; when
any are in disequilibrium, the person is diseased. It follows that
reversing disequilibrium in disease restores health. Thus, for bilious
patients (with excess bile) and phlegmatic patients (with excess
phlegm) the Hippocratic Affectations makes the following pre-
scription: “In cleaning, employ medications according to the
following principle: when patients are bilious, give medications
that clean out bile; when they are phlegmatic, give medications
that clean out phlegm” (Potter, 1988, pp. 43). Bloodletting, a ther-
apy commonly used for thousands of years and for a wide range ofhappen before the antecedents of the outcome are established. For instance, what
will happen in the future to the patient if they are treated?
4 Hempel (1962) also proposed a statistical model analogous to the DN Model
that at first glance might seem more relevant, but because the model is intertwined
with Hempel’s interpretation of probability we will not discuss the details of the
statistical model here.
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pp. 72).
We can model this kind of theoretical or mechanistic prediction
as follows.
The humoural scheme is a model of prediction for treatment that
follows the DN pattern. The prediction activity represented by the
model is a predictive inference because we directly infer the pre-
diction claim.
Aside from humoural theory, Hippocratic medicine was also
notable for its emphasis on clinical observation. Hippocrates and
his followers realized that diseases have a predictable natural
course that can be abstracted from observation of similar cases. The
Hippocratic Prognostic dictates that: “He who would make accurate
forecasts as to those who will recover, and those who will die, and
whether the disease will last a greater or less number of days, must
understand all the symptoms thoroughly.For it is by the same
symptoms in all cases that you will know the diseases that come to
a crisis at the times I have stated” (Potter, 1988, pp. 48).
We can represent the reasoning as follows.
In contrast to the humoural scheme for treatment, the clinical
observation scheme is a model of prediction for prognosis. Greek
for ‘the process of knowing before’, prognosis is the act of pre-
dicting a future clinical outcome in a treated or untreated case.
Once again, the prediction activity is a predictive inference. How-
ever, rather than deduction from theory, this time the inference is
an enumerative induction from past experience.5
Throughout subsequent history, the two distinct kinds of pre-
diction that coexisted in Hippocratic medicinedinference from
theory and induction from experiencedcontinued to coexist,
though sometimes as rival rather than complementary approaches.
Robyn Bluhm and Kirstin Borgerson describe “two traditions in
medicine”: the “rationalist” and “empiricist” traditions (2011, pp.
204). Inference from theory is most aligned with the rationalist or
mechanist tradition in the history of medicine. The mechanist
tradition championed the establishment of medical theory or
mechanisms of clinical causation as the route to medical knowl-
edge; we can identify monumental figures like Paracelsus (1493e
1541) and Claude Bernard (1813e1878) with this strain. In com-
parison, induction from experience is better linked to the empiricist
tradition, which emphasized observation, classification, counting,
and comparison, and within which Thomas Sydenham (1624e
1689) and P.-C.-A. Louis (1787e1872) can be placed.
Several antecedents were important in the rise of the standard
model of contemporary medical prediction, which grew out of the
empiricist tradition. With the development of epidemiology and
statistics in the early Twentieth Century came new methods for
classifying, counting and comparing, as well as for inductive
inference. Then in the 1960s, the science of clinical epidemiology
was born, which sought to apply these new tools to clinical
research (Bluhm & Borgerson, 2011). Through carefully quantifying
outcomes in a population of patients, one can predict outcomes or5 The models we have presented are necessarily idealizations of the Hippocratic
approach; ‘necessarily’ because all models in the present sense aredby defi-
nitiondideal representations.determine their probability in future patients in a more precise way
than is offered by simple enumerative induction.
While early Twentieth Century remedies typically aimed to cure
disease or relieve symptoms, the second half of the century saw a
shift towards disease prevention, especially the prevention of
cancer and heart disease, the leading killers in developed societies
(WHO, 2011). Making use of their new tools, epidemiologists and
clinical researchers began to classify risk factors, quantify the risk of
disease associated with these factors, and measure the effective-
ness and safety of new interventions to prevent disease.
Meanwhile, a new era of consumer protectionism was begin-
ning, including in healthcare. In the USA, the federal government
granted increasing powers to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to regulate the pharmaceutical marketplace, eventually
requiring that all new drugs demonstrate safety and efficacy in
clinical trials prior to market approval (Peltzman, 1973). This
legislation guarantees the existence of population studies for all
new drugs marketed in the USA. However, in the early 1990s a
group of clinical epidemiologists primarily located at McMaster
University in Canada began to express concern that despite the
abundance of tools from clinical epidemiology as well as epide-
miological and clinical research evidence, medical practitioners
were not using the tools or keeping up with the evidence. From
their efforts, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement
sprung into existence.
EBM represents the maturation of the medical empiricist
tradition; it advocates applying the results of population studies
over mechanistic reasoning or induction from personal clinical
experience in diagnosis, prognosis and therapy (Howick, 2011a). It
was defended as a new “paradigm” for medical practice
(Djulbegovic, Guyatt, & Ashcroft, 2009; EBMWorking Group, 1992),
and has become dominant in medical research and education,
accepted by leading medical schools and all of the major medical
journals. With the increase in evidence-based clinical practice
guidelines late in the Twentieth Century in terms of number and
influence (Upshur, 2014), EBM set the new standard for clinical
reasoning.
These developments led to the emergence and ascendance of a
new model of medical prediction, which we will introduce in the
next section.
3. Introducing the Risk GP Model
Two approachesdinference from theory and induction from
experiencedcharacterized medical prediction from Hippocratic
medicine down to the present. In the Twentieth Century, owing to
the development of clinical epidemiology, a shift towards disease
prevention, tighter drug regulation, the emergence of the EBM
movement, and an increase in practice guidelines, a new epide-
miological modeldthe Risk GP Modeldemerged. A refinement on
the ‘induction from experience’ approach, it has become the stan-
dard model of prediction in contemporary medicine.
Part of the advantage of an epidemiological or statistical model
of prediction over simple enumerative induction is that patients
with the same observed clinical features develop different out-
comes. One patient with high blood pressure will have a heart
attack, while another patient will not. This difference might arise
because the causal factors responsible for heart attack in a patient
with high blood pressure are indeterministic. The difference might
also occur because patients with high blood pressure vary in factors
(including unknown factors) that contribute to heart attack.
As a result of differing outcomes among patients, the frequency
of an outcome in a population will rarely be zero or one. None-
theless, public health practitioners may wish to predict the fre-
quency in order to plan health services or enact health policy. To
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study population and use the result to predict the future frequency
in a particular target population.
Population-level predictions are only indirectly relevant for
bedside medicine because physicians treat individual patients, not
populations. The physician and their patient want to know the
particular patient’s prognosis and whether the patient will respond
to the proposed treatment. Reasoning about the mechanism that
produces the outcome in order to answer these questions un-
doubtedly faces challenges.6 We do not know in exactly which
patients the mechanism will operate successfully to produce the
outcome, or else we would define our target populations more
narrowly than at present to include just those individuals. Of
course, neither does the frequency of the outcome in the target
population tell us which patients will develop the outcome. But this
frequency can help us to quantify our uncertainty; we can deter-
mine the probability that a patient in the target population will
develop the outcome.
Frequencies are not the only aggregates we can measure in a
population. We could also calculate the average for a clinical vari-
able with a range of values greater than two, and often do. But
frequencies are sometimes easier to measure and often easier to
interpret. Furthermore, frequenciesdbut not averagesdcan tell us
the probability of the outcome for a patient. Perhaps for these
reasons, frequencies are so often used in medical prediction, and
will serve as our paradigm example of an aggregate outcome. The
absolute risk (AR) is the epidemiological term for the frequency of
outcome O in a population:
AR ¼ (number of O in population)/(n of population)
The absolute risk figures in prognostic prediction claims. For
instance, according to the widely used Framingham Risk Scale, the
ten-year untreated risk (AR:X) of cardiovascular disease (CVD),
including a heart attack or stroke, in a womanwith 19 ‘CVD points’
(assigned based on a number of risk factors) is about 25%
(D’Agostino et al., 2008). In other words, we predict that in a pop-
ulation of untreated womenwith 19 CVD points, 25% will develop a
CVD outcome over the next ten years.
In patients that are part of a “high-risk” population, defined as a
population in which the untreated risk of CVD is 20% or greater
(Genest et al., 2009, pp. 570), a cholesterol-lowering drug called a
statin is often prescribed. From clinical trial evidence (Baigent et al.,
2005) we might predict that the treated risk (ARX) in the high-risk
group described abovedthe frequency of CVD among patients
treated with a statindis approximately 20%.7 This figure alone tells
us nothing about the effectiveness of the drug; the untreated risk
might be the 25% cited above, but it might also be 20% (the treat-
ment prevents no CVD on net) or even <20% (the treatment causes
CVD on net). To discover a treatment’s overall effectiveness, we
must compare the ARX to the AR:X using some measure of effect
size (ES) such as the relative risk (RR)8:
RR ¼ ARX/AR:X6 We will not examine them in detail here, but see Howick (2011b) and Clarke
et al. (2014) for a discussion of some of the challenges.
7 The figure cited is for a 1 mmol/L reduction in LDL cholesterol, which will be
assumed from this point on. Therapeutic effectiveness is expected to vary by the
amount of reduction in LDL cholesterol achieved.
8 ‘Effect size’ sometimes refers exclusively to measures in which the difference in
outcome between groups is divided by the variability (Guyatt et al., 2008, pp. 782).
Here, we use the term to denote any measure of causal association between
exposure and outcome.Measures of effect size are used in therapeutic (effectiveness or
harm) prediction claims. For example, the relative risk of a CVD
event due to statin therapy is 0.8 (RR¼ 20%/25%); as an effect of the
statin, we predict that four fifths as many treated patients will have
a heart attack or stroke over the next ten years compared to un-
treated patients.
We could also quantify the effect size using the absolute risk
reduction, also known as the risk difference (RD):
RD ¼ AR:X  ARX
The risk difference of CVD due to statins in women with 19 CVD
points is 5% (RD ¼ 25%e20%); in other words, we predict that the
difference in frequency of CVD events between treated and un-
treated patients attributed to the statin will be 5%.
In short, predictions in the standard model involve risk mea-
sures: either the absolute risk or a measure of effect size derived
from the absolute risk such as the relative risk or risk difference. For
prognostic predictions (involving the absolute risk), the standard
model can be represented as follows.
From the absolute risk of outcome O measured in a study popula-
tion, we predict the absolute risk in a target population defined by
clinical features ‘F’, which can be filled in with whatever prognostic
factors we choose. From this prediction claim, we then infer the
probability of O for a patient from the target population. The pre-
diction activity represented by the model is thus a serial inference
consisting of two sub-inferences. As in all serial inferences, the
conclusion of the first sub-inference (the first three lines) is a
premise in the second sub-inference (the final three lines).
Furthermore, both sub-inferences are enthymematic because they
rely upon other premises or assumptions (represented by the el-
lipses) that are suppressed. As we will see, different assumptions
might validate the model equally well; but its core structuredthe
expressed premises and the ultimate conclusiondis unchanging.
As an illustration, in determining that the patient we described
earlier has an untreated CVD risk of 25%, we implicitly relied on this
model. Our judgement required that we place the patient in a well-
defined target or reference population (womenwith 19 CVD points)
that has an associated absolute risk of 25%, as reported in the
clinical literature (Genest et al., 2009). ‘Womenwith 19 CVD points’
describes a very large (perhaps temporally unbounded) population.
The researchers who developed the Framingham prognostic model
certainly did not predict the absolute risk in this population by
measuring properties of each of its members. Rather, our 25% ab-
solute risk prediction is an extrapolation from a study that followed
a sample of women (and men) over time and measured the fre-
quency of cardiovascular disease events that accrued (D’Agostino
et al., 2008).
Within the Risk GP Model, O can refer to a future event or
outcome (narrow prediction), or it can refer to any unobserved
event or outcome (wide prediction). The prediction activity that
leads me to call ‘heads’ when the coin is in the air is just as sound if
the coin has already landed but is covered by your hand. Thus, the
version of Risk GP presented above can also be used for diagnostic
predictions. In diagnosis, the outcome has already developed
(several patients in the target population already have the disease
O) but the frequency is not definitively known. Rather than
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test results.
For therapeutic predictions, the standard model is essentially
the same, but involves the effect size rather than the absolute risk.
We start with the effect size for an outcome O due to exposure X (a
treatment), measured in a study population. From the effect size in
the study population, we predict the effect size in target population
F. Then from the effect size in the target population, we derive the
change in probability of O for a patient from the target population
upon exposure to X.
For example, we might want to treat our patient who has a 25%
untreated risk of CVD with a statin drug. The medical literature
(Baigent et al., 2005) reports that we can reduce the patient’s risk of
CVD by one fifth in relative terms (from 25% to 20%). Recall that the
untreated risk of CVD varies by reference population, and is not 25%
in all patients. Thus, in order to derive the 25%-to-20% risk change
we again had to place our patient in the target population con-
sisting of women with 19 CVD points. The treatment effect size we
predict for this target population is extrapolated from clinical trials
enrolling a much smaller study population.
In summary, standard prediction in medicine is a two-stage
process. The first stage or sub-inference is a generalization or
extrapolation of a risk measure from a study to a target population
of our choice. The second stage or sub-inference is a particulariza-
tion or transformation of the value of the risk measure to yield
probabilistic information about a patient from the target popula-
tion. Hence, we call the standard model the Risk Generalizatione
Particularization (Risk GP) Model (the abbreviation is fitting
considering that most medical risk management takes place in
general practice (GP)). Generalization can be seen as the epidemi-
ology, public health or clinical practice guideline stage because the
conclusion is a population-level prediction. On the other hand,
particularization is best seen as the clinical medicine stage because
the conclusion concerns particular patients.
To be sure, the Risk GP Model is not the only prediction model
used in medicine. Enumerative induction is still important in
diagnosis and prognosis as physicians develop clinical experience
and an acute sensitivity to patterns of disease progression. It may
also underlie the prediction that a patient will benefit from a
treatment or experience certain side effects based on their previous
response to the treatment. On the other hand, mechanistic
reasoning resembling the humoural scheme may be used to justify
treatment for diseases of excess or deficiency.
Yet the Risk GP Model is aptly considered the standard model
because it is held up as a normative ideal by medical authorities, if
sometimes only implicitly. In other words, it is the gold standard.
The Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature, an authoritative
evidence-based medicine textbook, claims that applying study re-
sults to patient care requires askingwhether you can “generalize” or
“particularize” the results to your patient (Guyatt et al., 2008, pp. 6).
Paul Glasziou and David Mant explain what this assessment in-
volves in the context of treatment decisions: “The first stage in-
volves an assessment of the transferability of the trial evidence [to
your care setting]; the second deals with the application by the
clinician to the individual” (2007, pp. 88e89).
Other textbooks, surveys and articles also identify generaliza-
tion or particularization as the gold standard approach(Djulbegovic, Hozo, & Greenland, 2011; Fuller, 2013a; Glasziou &
Irwig, 1995; Goodman, 1999; Post, de Beer, & Guyatt, 2013;
Straus, Glasziou, Richardson, & Haynes, 2011; Szklo & Nieto,
2007, p. 376). For instance, Piet Post et al. (2013) did a system-
atic review of the medical literature to identify approaches to
generalizing efficacy results. They recommended that decision-
makers generalize the relative effect size (e.g. relative risk)
found in randomized clinical trials to the target patient popula-
tion, a proposal that was reflected in most of the sources they
identified, including several EBM guides. In order to determine
how a treatment will lower a particular patient’s risk, we then
need to consider their particular untreated risk, which we infer
from a prognostic study (Glasziou & Irwig, 1995; Glasziou & Mant,
2007).
Moreover, Risk GP is the inferential model implicit in
evidence-based practice guidelines, which set the standard of
medical care. Jonathan Fuller (2013a) surveyed clinical guidelines
recommending the use of common prescription medications and
found that generalization from clinical trial results was used every
time to support treatment recommendations for a guideline’s
target patient population. Clinicians who follow the advice of
evidence-based guidelines thus relydif unknowinglydon the
soundness of an extrapolation inference. They may not always
interpret the effect sizes reported in guidelines probabilistically,
but in the case of preventive treatment, the benefits of the rec-
ommended therapy are often described as a lowering or reduction
of a patient’s risk of the undesired outcome (Genest et al., 2009;
Papaioannou et al., 2010; Rabi et al., 2011); the use of this lan-
guage promotes a probabilistic interpretation. By establishing the
standard of care, clinical guidelines play a substantial role in
directing clinical practice; this is especially the case when the
standard is reinforced through schemes that reward providers for
following guideline recommendations or through computerized
prompts that encourage adherence to recommendations at the
point of care. Through authoritative guides and practice guide-
lines, Risk GP is a powerful standardizing influence on modern
clinical practice.
The Risk GeneralizationeParticularization Model is the new
standard. It tries to overcome the challenges with other models of
prediction by using outcomes in study populations as a basis for
prediction activities involving target populations and individual
patients. In the next two sections, we will explore each constitutive
inferencedgeneralization and particularizationdin turn. We will
also rehearse some old problems and raise some new concerns
with the standard model.
4. Generalization
4.1. The inference scheme
Medicine (broadly construed to include public health) makes
population-level predictions. For instance, the World Health Or-
ganization predicts that the number of annual worldwide cardio-
vascular deaths will be 23.3 million in 2030 (Mathers & Loncar,
2006; WHO, 2011). Prognostic predictions are typically based on
the frequency of the outcomemeasured in study populations. Thus,
the Framingham Heart Study measured cardiovascular disease
outcomes over twelve years in a cohort of 8,491 adults with no
history of major CVD (D’Agostino et al., 2008). It was from these
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absolute risk in targeted risk groups, was developed.9
Similarly, in treatment we use the Risk GP Model to predict the
effect size in the target from the effect size in a study. Rather than
the frequency or average value of the outcome, the effect size
quantifies the change in the frequency or average. Our earlier effect
size prediction for statin therapy was based on the relative risk
reported in the Cholesterol Treatment Trialist meta-analysis of
randomized controlled trials, which analyzed data from 90,056 trial
participants (Baigent et al., 2005). The inference involved in pre-
dicting the effect size is variously called a ‘generalization’,
‘extrapolation’ or ‘transportation’ of the treatment effect (Horton,
2000). We can represent the extrapolation of either the absolute
risk or the effect size using the inference scheme above.We can also
identify the scheme as a predictive inference because we directly
infer a prediction claim about a risk measure in a target population.
Of course, we should not demand that this prediction is perfectly
accurate because we never expect that the risk measure in the
target will exactly equal the risk measure in the study (perhaps the
true relative risk is 0.8 in the study and 0.85 in the target). The
prediction succeeds so long as the absolute risk or effect size we
predict by extrapolating from the study is close enough to the true
value in the target (though we usually do not specify how close is
‘close enough’).
Treatment effect predictions depend upon the prior judgement
that the association we are extrapolating is indeed an effect of the
treatment rather than a correlation with a different explanation.
This prior ‘causal inference’ is distinct from the ‘causal prediction’
that we have so far been considering. The causal inference begins
with a correlation between exposure and outcome of magnitude r
in the study population; it concludes that the correlation is the
effect of the exposure in the study. In contrast, the causal prediction
starts from this effect size of magnitude r in the study, and con-
cludes that the effect size in a target population will also be r.
Interpreting the effect size, telling a causal story based on the
numbers, is more difficult than it first appears. Recall that we
predict a CVD risk difference of 5% due to a statin medication in a
population with an untreated risk of 25%
(RD ¼ AR:X  ARX ¼ 25%  20% ¼ 5%). It is tempting to conclude
that the statin will prevent CVD in exactly 5% of treated patients,
but this conclusion does not follow from the numbers alone. As
Broadbent argues (2013, pp. 117e121), an exposure may cause or
prevent the effect with a greater frequency than is quantified by the
measure.
This scenario can occur if the exposure replaces other causes
that would have otherwise produced the outcome. In a study
examining the effects of one hour/day exercise on quality of life,
busier participants might substitute the exercise for another ac-
tivity they were previously enjoying. The exercise regime might
cause wellbeing for these participants but in lieu of their previous
activities, so there would be no difference in overall effect to
quantify. Furthermore, as is well recognized, a 5% net difference in
outcome is perfectly consistent with the exposure preventing the
outcome in more than 5% of exposed participants if it also causes
the outcome in some other exposed participants (Cartwright,
2010). In neither of these two scenarios does the effect size reveal
the frequency with which the exposure caused or prevented the
outcome. The effect size simply reveals the net difference in
outcome causally attributable to the exposure (Broadbent, 2013, pp.
53e54).9 The development of the Framingham scale involved statistical modelling, but
the algorithm still extrapolates from outcomes measured in a (cohort) study.Returning to the generalization inference, a crucial assumption
is represented by the ellipsis in the scheme above: a representa-
tiveness assumption, stating that the study population is sufficiently
similar to the target population. With this assumption we are
justified in expecting a similar effect, but evidence is required to
support it. The evidence might consist in certain methodological
features of the study, or in empirical evidence for causal compa-
rability. As we will now see, we should be concerned that we often
do not have the needed evidence, that the representativeness
assumption fails in typical extrapolations, and that the assumption
is poorly articulated in medicine.4.2. The trouble with the generalization
Having described its structure, we will now discuss the main
problem with the Risk GP generalization scheme: trouble with its
representativeness assumption. As Broadbent argues (2013, pp.
107e108), the entire work of extrapolation is done by this
assumption. Yet several philosophers and medical commentators
are worried that in extrapolatingdin particular, in extrapolating
treatment effectsdwe often fail to take account of the assump-
tion, even when the representativeness of the study should be in
doubt.
Evidence for sufficient similarity is typically one of two kinds:
methodological or causal-empirical. Methodological evidence for
the representativeness of the study considers how the study
population was sampled; in particular, if the study population was
a large random sample from the target population, we might
assume (perhaps after checking a few variables known to be
important) that the effect size statistic in the study represents the
effect size statistic in the target. This judgement also demands
that the study protocol creates study conditionsdincluding life-
style circumstances and environmental exposuresdthat are
representative of the conditions the target population will
encounter.
Unfortunately, study populations are not always samples from
the target population. In extrapolating the effect size measured in a
clinical trial, our targetmight be a population that was ineligible for
the trial, such as older patients or patients with other concurrent
diseases. If the study population is not a sample from the target
population, then it cannot be a random sample from the target.
Evenwhen the extrapolation is from a sample to the population
sampleddwhat Rudolf Carnap (1945) called the “inverse infer-
ence”dclinical trials, the studies from which we most commonly
extrapolate effect size estimates, seldom sample randomly (Bluhm
& Borgerson, 2011). Instead, strict inclusion and exclusion criteria
are used to determine the wider population eligible for enrolment,
and factors such as proximity to the trial site further decide which
patients are actually enrolled. Thus, in extrapolating the effect size,
methodological reasons for assuming representativeness are rarely
satisfied.10
In the absence of a methodological warrant for extrapolation,
we need some form of causal-empirical evidence. In general, this
evidence consists of two parts: knowledge of the variables
appearing in the causal mechanisms from exposure to outcome,
and empirical data on the distribution of these variables in the
study compared to the target. For instance, assuming that the10 There have been recent calls for conducting ‘pragmatic trials’ (vs. ‘explanatory’
or ‘efficacy trials’) in medicine, embodied in a series of articles published in the
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology (Zwarenstein & Treweek, 2009). Pragmatic trials are
designed to inform treatment decisions by deliberately enrolling typical patients in
typical care settings. They are thus ideal candidates for studies that provide
methodological evidence for representativeness.
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ticulates sufficient conditions for extrapolating the effect size from
study population X to target population q: (a) X and q are the same
with respect to “[t]he causal laws affecting O”, and (b) “[e]ach
‘causally homogeneous’ subclass has the same probability in q as in
X” (2011, pp. 754). The latter condition (b) specifies that the causal
variables are distributed identically in the study and the target,
while the former condition (a) ensures that if the causal variables
are distributed identically, their contribution to the outcomewill be
the same. Cartwright emphasizes how epistemically demanding
these conditions are. She argues that this depth of knowledge is
never obtained in reality, but that moreover, we should not expect
any set of sufficient conditions for extrapolation to hold widely, so
the effect size will seldom be transportable.
Similarly, Daniel Steel argues that “similarity in all relevant re-
spects may be required for extrapolating an exact, quantitative
causal effect” from a study or “base population” to a target popu-
lation (2008, pp. 80).11 Like Cartwright, Steel concludes that
because background causes always differ between two populations,
quantitative causal effects will rarely be replicated in a target
population, even if the target is closely ancestrally related to the
study population.
We present the proposals of Cartwright and Steel only to illus-
trate the kinds of causal-empirical knowledge that could plausibly
allow us to extrapolate the effect size. It is possible to conceive of
other conditions for generalizing. However, if these other condi-
tions are anywhere near as demanding, we must concede that the
kinds of knowledge and data needed will be difficult to come by.
Several authors in the medical literature have also presented
considerations for extrapolation that attempt to locate causally
relevant similarities and differences between two populations
(Cowan & Wittes, 1994; Dans, Dans, Guyatt, & Richardson, 1998;
Dekkers, von Elm, Algra, Romijn, & Vandenbroucke, 2010; Post
et al., 2013; Rubins, 1994). Unfortunately, these suggestions typi-
cally lack rigour, and fall far short of spelling out the conditions
needed to validate the generalization inference. For instance, under
the heading of “Process of evaluation of compelling reasons that
might limit generalizability”, Post and colleagues present a list of
six questions adapted from the “User’s Guides” to assessing the
applicability of clinical trial results (Dans et al., 1998). The questions
include: “Are there [biological] patient differences that may
diminish the treatment response?”, and “Are there important dif-
ferences in patient compliance that may diminish the treatment
response?” (Post et al., 2013, pp. 642). Their approach to assessing
group comparability is literally question begging; it provides us
with no answers as to when patient differences will modify the
effect size. Thus, the standard model of generalization is too ellip-
tical, incomplete as a model for medical prediction.12
The claim made by Cartwright and Steel that effect sizes are
seldom transportable to different populations is an empirical one;
its truth depends on how often in reality our study and target
populations are causally comparable in all of the right ways. Many
medical commentators seem to share their concern; they worry
that our randomized clinical trials in practice fail to represent our
target populations. Thus, the “external validity” or “generaliz-
ability” of these trialsdthe extent to which the trial results predict
the results of intervening elsewheredmight be poor (Black, 1998;11 Steel also defines a less restrictive sense of representativeness inwhich the base
and target are “cell representative” (2008), pp. 205e208, however the conditions
under which we can extrapolate according to the cell representativeness criterion
are only slightly less demanding.
12 Cartwright (2007) forcefully criticizes our effectiveness predictions for their
lack of rigour.Campbell-Scherer, 2010; Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997; Rawlins,
2008; Rothwell, 2005; Upshur, 2005).
Concerns about the generalizability of our evidence base are
legitimate. Not only do investigators seldom aim for representative-
ness in clinical trial design, but the routine design of these trials
promotes gross unrepresentativeness. For instance, enrolment criteria
in trials often exclude older patients, patients with multiple diseases,
and patients taking multiple medications (Van Spall, Toren, Kiss, &
Fowler, 2007). Yet given the demographics of patients in hospital
and community practice (Bajcar et al., 2010; Goulding, Rogers, &
Smith, 2003; Salisbury, Johnson, Purdy, Valderas, & Montgomery,
2011), target populations often include these very patients that tri-
als exclude. Age-related physiological changes, diseases and medica-
tions might causally interact with the treatment, modifying the effect
size. Thus, we should in the very least be cautious about extrapolating
effect sizes from typical trials to typical target populations. Since the
conditions for sound extrapolation are poorly articulated inmedicine,
we might worry that practitioners reasoning within the Risk GP
generalization scheme would default to the conclusion without
careful attention to the causal context of study and target.13 In these
cases, the assumption of representativenessdhowever we choose to
formulate itdmay fail, and we may be led into error.
5. Particularization
5.1. The inference scheme
Generalization is a predictive inference in which we project
either the frequency of O or the effect size from a study population
onto a target population. The term ‘generalization’ might be
preferred by some authors to emphasize that it is an inference from
the less general (a relatively small population, often atypical with
respect to its clinical features) to the more general (usually a much
larger, more typical patient population). For the sake of contrast, we
call the subsequent inference a ‘particularization’ because it is an
inference from the less particular (a population) to the more
particular (a patient).
The same clinical sources that discuss generalizing or extrapo-
lating often do not describe the subsequent inference from group
aggregate outcomes to individual patient outcomes. The inference
is suppresseddbut some prediction activity must be at work if
medicine is to have anything to say about a patient’s prognosis or
about the potential benefits and harms of treatment for that pa-
tient. If we do indeed make inferences about patients in clinical
medicine, then what might those inferences look like?
We will first consider whether the standard approach in prog-
nosis is to infer the full-stop claim that ‘patient a will O’. Carnap
considered this type of induction a special case of the “direct
inference”dthe inference from a population to a sample drawn
from the populationdin which the sample has an n of 1 (1945, pp.
84e85). If the absolute risk of O is less than 100% but still high in
target population F (most Fs willO), wemight predict that this Fwill
O. We can construct the n-of-1 direct inference as follows.13 In evidence-based medicine, the conclusion that trial results are generalizable
is indeed treated as a default, and one is instructed to look not for evidence of
representativeness but for evidence that the present case is an exception to the
rule. For an example of this approach, see Post et al. (2013); for a critique of their
position, see Fuller (2013b).
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reason according to this scheme. One might worry about the cor-
rectness of the inference. For example, it does not preclude the
possibility that a is also a G, and that most Gs will :O (an instance of
the reference class problem, discussed further in Section 5.2). Yet
even if the inferencewere unproblematic, the descriptive accuracy of
the model for medical prediction is certainly not unproblematic.
Medicine often deals with outcomes that are not very common but
are still importantdeither theyare highly valuedorhighly disvalued.
The Framingham Risk Scale considers as a high-risk group (Fs) a
population inwhich the frequency of a CVD event (O) is 20%. Despite
the fact that most Fs in this group will not develop CVD, a physician
will often act to prevent CVDby prescribing a statinmedication. Ifwe
assume that physicians have some justification (however sound or
unsound) for treatinghigh-risk patientswith statins,wemust search
for the justification beyond the n-of-1 direct inference scheme.
Instead of a full-stop, definite prediction claim, physicians are
instructed to communicate the patient’s risk of the outcome
(Goodman,1999). The slip from talking about risk in a population to
talking about a patient’s risk is subtle but not trivial; it signals a
shift in meaning from ‘risk’ as frequency of the outcome to ‘risk’ as
probability of the outcome. The Framingham Risk Scale does allow
us to predict the future prevalence of CVD in an untreated high-risk
population (risk as frequency). But the Risk Scale is primarily
intended as a tool for bedside medicine, so it seems unlikely that
the ultimate aim of the scale is to predict the frequency of CVD in a
population. Rather, the investigators of the Framingham Heart
Study note that the purpose of their study was “to formulate a
single multivariable risk assessment tool that would enable phy-
sicians to identify high-risk candidates for any and all initial
atherosclerotic CVD events usingmeasurements readily available at
the clinic or office” (D’Agostino et al., 2008, pp. 744; emphasis
added). The purpose of the Framingham Risk Scale is to estimate a
patient’s risk of CVD (risk as probability) so that therapy can be
rationally considered.14
The transition from frequencies to probabilities often goes un-
noticed, and thus the two-stage inference involved in standard
medical prediction is sometimes presented as a single step (Guyatt
et al., 2008, pp. 6). However, particularization is an inference
distinct from the generalization from study population to target
population. In prognosis under the Risk GPModel, particularization
is an inference from the premise that the frequency or absolute risk
of the outcome in a target population F is r to the conclusion that
the probability of the outcome for a patientdgiven that the patient14 Many authoritative sources use the concept of risk as probability. Paul Glasziou
and Les Irwig write, “To identify patients who should expect benefit to be greater
than harm, we need to predict each patient’s risk” (1995), pp. 1358. The Users’
Guides claim, “Clinicians require studies of prognosisd those examining the
possible outcomes of a disease and the probability with which they can be expected
to occur” (Guyatt et al., 2008), pp. 511. In the Preface to a Lancet volume called
Treating Individuals, Peter Rothwell raises a key question that he claims is frequently
asked by clinicians applying study results: “How can I judge whether the proba-
bility of benefit from treatment in my current patient is likely to differ substantially
from the average probability of benefit reported in the relevant trial or systematic
review?” (2007), pp. ix.
15 We should emphasize that the probability generated by Risk GP is a conditional
probability: p(O/F). The p(O/F) is a probability ‘for a patient’ insofar as that patient is
an F. It should not be confused with some single case probability or chance that is
fixed by all of the physical facts relevant for that patient. If such a non-trivial single
case probability exists, its value will most likely diverge from the p(O/F) because the
target population F is typically heterogeneous.is an Fdis r. Communicating a patient’s risk in standard practice
means expressing a probability equal to the absolute risk we pre-
dict in a reference population within which the patient can be
placed (Djulbegovic et al., 2011; Goodman, 1999).15
The ellipsis in the particularization scheme above represents
further needed assumptions. One indispensable assumption is that
the patient under consideration is indeed a member of the refer-
ence population: patient a is an F. If the patient is not a member of
population F, then there are no grounds for measuring the proba-
bility of the outcome for the patient from the frequency of the
outcome in F.
A second important assumption is invoked to support the
transition from frequencies to probabilities: the probability of each
member of target population F is the same (F ¼ {x1, x2,., xn},
p(x1) ¼ p(x2) ¼.p(xn)). No member of F is any more or less likely
the patient whose individual risk we are presently estimating.16 To
illustrate this idea, imagine that all members of the target popu-
lation were registered in a large central database. Imagine also that
we had a randomizerdperhaps a computer programdthat
randomly selected a patient from the list, so that each patient had
the same probability of being chosen, equal to 1/n (where n is the
size of the population). If the absolute risk or frequency of Owill be
2% and there are 100 patients on the list, we predict that 2 patients
will have the outcome. The probability of randomly selecting one of
these two patients that will develop the outcome is p(OjF) ¼ 1/
100 þ 1/100 ¼ 2/100, which is equal to the absolute risk. However,
if the randomizer was broken and as a result one of these two
patients was ten times as likely to be chosen compared to any other
patient on the list, then p(OjF) ¼ 10/100 þ 1/100 ¼ 11/100, which is
not equal to the absolute risk. The assumption that the probability
of each member of the target population is the same is crucial for
the particularization inference. In the next section, wewill consider
the extent to which this assumption and the assumption that pa-
tient a is an F are reasonable in clinical medicine.
Just as physicians are often interested in uncommon but
meaningful outcomes in prognosis, in treatment they are often
interested in small but clinically important effect sizes. Recall that
the CVD risk difference attributable to a statin is 5% in a target
population with an untreated risk of 25%
(RD¼AR:X ARX¼ 25% 20%¼ 5%). If we had to predict anything
definite, we would predict that the patient will not have the
outcome either way because the frequencies of O among treated
and untreated patientsd25% and 20%, respectivelydarewell below
50%. Yet guidelines recommend treating this population with a
statin (Genest et al., 2009) because CVD events are so undesirable
and statins are thought to decrease the patient’s risk.17 Similar to
prognostic particularization, treatment particularization under the
Risk GP Model is not a predictive inference to outcomes that we
predict will occur but an inference to probabilities of occurrence.
The same two assumptions needed in prognosis are thus also
needed in treatment: the patient is a member of the reference
population, and the reference population is an unbiased
probability-generating setup.
In treatment, particularization involves the effect size.We saw in
theprevious section that interpreting theeffect size is tricky. Itmight
be an error to believe that the risk difference reveals the frequency
with which the exposure will cause the outcome in the target16 To use Ian Hacking’s terminology, the chance setupdfor us the target popu-
lation along with the mechanism for selecting patients for risk assessmentdmust
be unbiased (Hacking, 2001), pp. 24e25.
17 Prudential judgementsdthose involving a joint consideration of the probability
and desirability of the outcomedare essentially judgements of the expected utility
of a course of action, even when the reasoning is qualitative or not made fully
explicit.
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bility that the treatment will cause the outcome from the risk
difference.
Instead, we infer the change in probability of the outcome due to
the exposure (Dp(OjF) ¼ r) from the effect size attributable to the
exposure (ES ¼ r). If the effect size is measured as the relative risk,
then the relevant change in probability is p(OjX&F)/p(Oj:X&F)
because RR ¼ ARX/AR:X ¼ p(OjX&F)/p(Oj:X&F). However, if the
effect size is measured as the risk difference, then the relevant
change in probability is p(Oj:X&F)  p(OjX&F) because
RD ¼ AR:X  ARX ¼ p(Oj:X&F)  p(OjX&F). In deciding whether or
not to treat, the ideal comparison modelled by Risk GP is between
the probability of O given treatment (for O) and the probability of O
given no treatment (for O).18
In deciding whether or not to treat, it is important that the
change in probability of the outcome reflects the effect size of the
treatment rather than a mere correlation between treatment and
outcome. Switching your mailing address on a heart health survey
from your home to your workplace address might switch your
reference population for the study. If your new estimated proba-
bility of CVD qua member of the new reference population was
different, you would not conclude that changing your address on
the form had any effect on your cardiovascular health. Analogously,
a physician should not recommend a potentially harmful treatment
if all it will do with respect to the desired outcome is shuffle the
patient around into a different reference class. They should
recommend treatment to a patient only if it is reasonable to believe
that the treatment might make a positive causal difference in the
outcome for that patient.
An error in our upstream causal inference (e.g. concluding that
there is an effect size due to mailing address from a confounded
correlation between CVD and mailing address) can lead to an error
in our downstream decision-making. More generally, an error in
any of our upstream inferences, including the generalization or the
particularization, might infect our ultimate conclusions. An infer-
ential chain is broken if there is a chink in any one of its constitutive
links. The particularization scheme is certainly not without its
weaknesses. As with generalization, there are problems with its
core assumptions, which we will now describe. We will then argue
that standard particularization fails to address a further issue that
probabilistic inferences involving single cases (e.g. patient a) must
confront: the reference class problem.5.2. The trouble with the particularization
In contrast with generalization, particularization is less often
discussed in the medical literature; it is largely an implicit step in
our medical prediction activities. Yet probabilistic reasoning in
general has received serious attention in the philosophy of science,
and as compared to generalization, the two assumptions needed for
valid particularization are easier to formulate.
First, we must assume that patient a is an F, or else the proba-
bility of the outcome in population F is not directly relevant for a.
Though the assumption might seem trivial from the perspective of
the inference scheme (it is presupposed by the conclusion), it is
non-trivial from the perspective of medical practice. Careful work
must be done to establish that the assumption is true. If ‘F’ reflects
some parameter that we can ascertain with relative ease such as a
high-risk score on the Framingham Risk Scale, we might be fairly
certain that the patient is an F. However, if ‘F’ reflects a diagnosis for18 In deciding between two alternate treatments (X and Z), the comparison is
instead between the probability of O given X (and not Z) and the probability of O
given Z (and not X).which we do not have decisive evidence, then our certainty in the
truth of the assumptionwill be significantly less. Our uncertainty as
towhether the patient is an F should then influence our uncertainty
as to whether the patient will have the outcome.
For the sake of illustration, say that you have an urn containing
spotted or freckled balls (F), as well as balls that are not freckled
(:F). Additionally, say that half of the freckled balls are orange (O).
Meanwhile, none of the not-freckled balls are orange. So
p(OjF) ¼ 0.5, while p(Oj:F) ¼ 0. Finally, precisely half of all of the
balls in the urn are freckled, p(F) ¼ 0.5. What is the probability that
you will randomly draw an orange ball from the urn, p(O)? It would
be arbitrary (and mistaken) to set your probability of O to p(OjF)
because we cannot assume that the ball you draw will be freckled;
it is just as likely that the ball will be not-freckled. The correct
probability is the probability of O given a ball of any colour. Since a
quarter of all balls in the urn are orange, p(O) ¼ 0.25 (p(O) ¼ p(OjF)
p(F)þ p(Oj:F)p(:F)¼ (0.5)(0.5)þ 0(0.5)¼ 0.25). From the equation
for p(O) just used, we see that it will only be the case that
p(O) ¼ p(OjF) when: (i) p(F) ¼ 1.0 (we are certain that the ball will
be F), or (ii) p(OjF) ¼ p(Oj:F) (the probability of O is the same
regardless of whether or not the ball is F). Otherwise, how closely
p(OjF) approximates p(O) depends on how close is our certainty to
1.0 that the ball will be F, and how close the p(Oj:F) is to the p(OjF).
In short, if we lack certainty about an individual’s membership
in F, we might not want to assume it for the sake of inference. Since
we are often relatively uncertain about a patient’s diagnosis or
about their membership in a risk group given fallible evidence, it
would often be imprudent to set our probability of O to p(OjF). The
Risk GP particularization does not accommodate diagnostic or
classificatory uncertainty, and provides no direction when con-
fronted with this frequent phenomenon. When both p(OjF) and
p(Oj:F) can be estimated, it would be better to reason according to
the equation for p(O) (total probability) above.
Particularization also relies upon a second assumption that is
sufficient for deriving p(OjF) from the frequency of O in target
population F: the probability of each member of target population F
is the same. Each member of the target population must have an
equal probability of having their risk assessed. We modelled this
situation with a database that included all patients in F and a
computer program that randomly chose a patient from the list.
We might wonder how well this probability model represents
our target populations in medicine. We can start by considering the
target populations defined by clinical practice guidelines. Guide-
lines are often produced by national professional groups and are
usually disease-specific, so their target populations will often
consist of all patients with a certain diagnosis in a particular
country. We might consider as a target population all patients on
the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) with a certain diagnosis. If
guidelines are supposed to guide individual clinicians, then the
relevant unknown is the probability of the outcome for a patient on
this list who is assessed by a given clinician. However, clearly not all
patients in the NHS have an equal chance of being seen by the same
doctor; those patients who live in the north of Scotland have a very
low chance of being seen by a physician in the south ofWales. Thus,
the probability model assumed by Risk GP is a poor fit for an
obvious example of a target population setup: a clinician applying a
practice guideline.
Perhaps instead we should define target population F to include
only those patients that are likely to be assessed by a given clini-
cian; for instance, everyone listed in a community physician’s
regular patient roster. Even thenwe should doubt that each patient
in the target population has an equal probability of being assessed;
some patients are rarely seen by their physician at all. So our
probability model might also inadequately represent a physician
assessing their registered patients. If assessment is correlated with
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are assessed will differ from the frequency of the outcome in the
overall target population. For example, it is reasonable to suspect
that patients with vague, undiagnosed cardiovascular symptoms
like occasional shortness of breath or minor chest pain are more
likely to have their risk of CVD assessed by their physician using the
Framingham scale. Since these symptoms sometimes indicate un-
derlying CVD, assessment might be correlated with CVD, even
among Framingham high risk patients (the target population). The
assumption that the probability of each patient is the same might
not hold in the context of our most natural examples of target
population setups, which may lead us to greatly misestimate the
probability of the outcome.
Aside from the trouble with its two assumptions, there is one
final weakness of the particularization scheme worth visiting, a
problemwith its conclusion. Most often target population F will be
a broadly defined group such as patients with a particular disease. It
is doubtful that the risk measure calculated in a study would be
generalizable to manymore narrowly defined target populations as
the relevant features according to which we might want to narrow
our target population are the same features that would ostensibly
modify the value of the risk measure. But when we can confidently
predict how a risk measure will differ according to other features
particular to the patient, we should. Many authors in the medical
literature have decried that our approach based on study averages
often loses sight of the relevant particularities of individuals
(Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997; Greenhalgh, Howick, & Maskrey, 2014;
Kravitz, Duan, & Braslow, 2004; Tanenbaum, 1993; Tonelli, 1998).
The perennial reference class problem looms in the background.
As the problem goes, a member of a population is also a member of
many subgroups of that population in which the probabilities
might differ. For practical purposes, one response makes intuitive
sense: we should make decisions based on the probability in the
narrowest informative reference class for which we can form a
reasonable probability judgement (Flores, 2015).19 If your high CVD
risk patient is a member of the subgroup of high-risk patients that
currently report crushing chest pain, then you are well advised to
act based on the probability of a heart attack in this more narrowly
defined group.
Another way to frame the response is as a matter of more evi-
dence. We might have good evidence for the prediction claim
beyond the study fromwhichwe extrapolated. This evidencemight
consist of the results of a different epidemiological study, or non-
epidemiological evidence such as the clinician’s experience sug-
gesting that patients similar to the one under consideration fair
differently on average. Sensibility (in addition to a body of philo-
sophical literature) dictates that we should condition our belief in
the hypothesis on all of the available evidence, and not only on the
results of a single study, however rigorous that single study may
be.20
The final problemwith the particularization is thus that it is not
particular enough; it fails to consider other features beyond ‘F’
particular to the patient, even when we have good evidence that
the probability given ‘F’ plus these other features diverges from the
probability given ‘F’ alone. Within the Risk GP prediction model, we19 We cannot defend the intuition here, but see discussion in Gillies (2000), pp.
119e123. Early notable ‘narrowest reference class’ solutions to the reference class
problem were given in Keynes (1921) and Ayer (1963). As Brendan Clarke et al.
argue (2014), features suggested by the relevant causal mechanisms may help us to
locate the relevant narrower reference class.
20 For instance, see Good (1967) and Ramsey (1990). Jacob Stegenga (2011) criti-
cizes the lack of evidential inclusiveness in medical treatment meta-analyses,
studies from which we often extrapolate an effect size estimate.aredat least sometimesdignoring information relevant to
prediction.
6. Trouble with the standard model and the case for model
pluralism
Confirmation that there is indeed a standard model of medical
prediction is provided by the fact that there seems to be a common
target of several compelling critiques in medicine and in the phi-
losophy of science. There are serious problems with the Risk GP
Model, especially with its assumptions, which are often difficult to
warrant with evidence and will often fail in practice. These prob-
lems are not challenges to the model’s validity, but rather to its
soundness in many instances of its use, and thus to its privileged
status as the standard model.
Since the assumptions are peculiar to the Risk GP Model, so too
are the problems with the assumptions. The model is not a
constraint on medical prediction becausedas we have seendthere
are other ways of predicting. Other models of prediction rely on
different assumptions, so that another model’s assumptions might
hold when Risk GP’s assumptions fail. Yet the relative lack of
attention that other models receive in medicine suggests a certain
inflexibility when it comes to prediction.
Medical prediction-makers are best served by adopting a
pluralist approach to prediction: exploring all of the options to
decide which model best fits the situation at hand. The first step
towards model pluralism is to recognize that there are other ways
of predicting. To that end, we introduce just a few alternate models
of prediction suggested by the preceding discussion. No doubt they
each have their ownweaknesses. We present them simply to make
the case that model pluralism is a practicable alternative to a one-
model-fits-all approach.
We saw that two distinct approaches to prediction have coex-
isted throughout history, one relying on theory or mechanisms, and
the other relying directly on experience. In mechanistic reasoning,
we start from known causal mechanisms from X to O. We then
predict that intervening with X will produce O (Andersen, 2012;
Howick, 2011b). In so doing, we make several assumptions; for
instance, that the mechanisms are understood in their full
complexity, that intermediate components of the mechanisms are
intact, that the mechanisms produce O with a high enough prob-
ability, and that the effect of O-producing mechanisms is not
masked by the presence of O-inhibiting mechanisms (Clarke,
Gillies, Illari, Russo, & Williamson, 2014; Howick, 2011b).
Because it does not depend on aggregate outcomes in pop-
ulations, mechanistic reasoning may be useful when any of Risk
GP’s assumptions fail or when we lack human studies altogether. It
is most dependable when the relevant mechanisms are simple and
well-established. As an example, osteoporosis medications are
commonly prescribed to prevent bone fractures (especially hip
fractures) in older women. A physician may worry that a particular
patient is less likely to benefit from osteoporosis medication than
the average target patient, or may have good reason to believe that
the patient will benefit but mayworry about harmful side effects. In
hopes of preventing fractures, they may put aside the empirical
evidence on osteoporosis medications and instead reason that
osteoporotic bone fractures are almost always caused by falls. They
might then suggest sensible measures to prevent falls in the home.
As another example, in medical conditions caused by nutrient or
hormone deficiency (e.g. iron deficiency, hypothyroidism), we may
reverse the condition very simply by supplying the nutrient or
hormone in which the patient is deficient. We rarely have clinical
research evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of various doses
of replacement for various magnitudes of deficiency. In lieu of
extrapolating from research studies, the physician might tailor the
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statistically normal range, especially if the deficiency is asymp-
tomatic (and thus the dose cannot be adjusted based on patient
feedback). This mechanistic reasoning is based on the simple
principle that if a deficiency causes a condition, curing the defi-
ciency cures the condition.
In contrast to mechanistic reasoning, predicting from personal
clinical observations is a model that often relies on an induction
from previous experience. There are two contexts in which it may
be useful: predicting from experience with previous patients, and
predicting from experience with the same patient. Predicting from
experiencewith previous patients may be useful when the research
literature lacks data on a relevant patient subgroup into which the
present patient falls; for instance, when the relevant subgroup is
hard to operationalize. Based on behavioural cues from their pa-
tient (the way the patient describes their symptoms, their affect,
their non-verbal communication), a physician may experience the
intuition that the patient is seriously unwell and at risk for further
deterioration in their health (a poor prognosis). It is difficult to
systematically study the subgroup ‘patients whose behaviour
triggers the clinical intuition that they are at risk of deterioration in
their health’, and an expert physicianmay have to rely on their own
experience with such patients in order to make a prognostic
inference.
On the other hand, predicting from experience with the same
patient is a useful approach in treatment when the patient’s
response is observable; for example, in treating symptoms. From
previous response to treatment, we predict future response to
treatment; or from previous superior response to one treatment
compared with another, we predict future superior response. We
must assume that the patient’s current physiology is sufficiently
similar to their previous physiology, but this judgement is often
easier to make and more reliable than the assumption that a study
population is sufficiently comparable to a target population. The
former assumption might be warranted when the latter assump-
tion is not. Even if the former assumption is satisfied, the inference
is not infallible; for instance, perhaps the patient’s previous
symptoms spontaneously remitted soon after starting treatment,
and the physician is wrong to infer that the treatment will relieve
the patient’s symptoms the next time they recur. Thus, the infer-
ence is strongest when the patient’s untreated symptoms or health
status are stable rather than fluctuating. The n-of-1 trial can be seen
as a refinement of this approach to address its weaknesses (Hankey,
2007). In an n-of-1 trial, a patient alternates between treatment
and no treatment (or between different treatments), outcomes are
systematically recorded, and effectiveness and safety are inferred,
sometimes with the aid of statistics.
Other models that maintain a role for controlled studies in
predicting the effect of an exposure or intervention but eschew
extrapolating the effect size include the proposals of Steel and
Cartwright. Although both of their approaches require detailed
background knowledge, in contrast to the generalization inference
scheme, the conditions for sound prediction are explicitly formu-
lated and thus may be easier to assess. According to Steel (2008),
even if we are unable to extrapolate the effect size from a study, we
might still be able to extrapolate the “positive causal relevance” of
the exposure. After formulating the notion of positive causal rele-
vance in terms of ideal causal Bayes nets interventions, he develops
a “mechanisms approach” to extrapolating positive relevance.
Oftentimes decision-makers wish to know an exposure’s effect size
to help decide among alternate courses of action. Other times,
predicting that the exposurewill have a positive (greater than zero)
effect in the target provides enough information. To illustrate, Steel
develops his theory mainly in the context of extrapolating from
animal studies, especially extrapolating harmful effects likecarcinogenicity. We may lack good epidemiologic data but possess
data from controlled animal experiments showing that an exposure
causes serious harm in animals. If we can extrapolate that the
exposure will also cause serious harm in at least some humans, this
conclusion might warrant public health action; we might dissem-
inate a public advisory warning, regulate the use of the exposure, or
ban its use altogether.
Meanwhile, when we have controlled human studies but they
are not sufficiently representative of the target, they might serve as
a proof of principle that the exposure can make a difference rather
than a base from which to extrapolate the effect size. Cartwright
(2012) advises asking whether the causal principle or mechanism
that operated in the controlled study will also operate in the target.
Predicting that the intervention “will work for us” also requires
knowing that certain support factors are present in the target
context to enable the intervention’s causal power. Her account
sheds special light on predictions involving policy or social in-
terventions. Extrapolating from clinical studies of behavioural or
complex care interventions is often difficult because the healthcare
context strongly determines effectiveness and will often vary
across sites, even within the same health system. An educational
intervention to promote diabetes self-management will only work
if the patient has the local resources to make lifestyle changes.
Similarly, the effectiveness of an interprofessional team interven-
tion aimed at developing comprehensive care plans for patients
withmultiple chronic conditions might depend on the composition
of the care team and the patient’s particular constellation of
diseases.
Probabilistic models to rival the Risk GP particularization
scheme are also available. As argued in Section 5.2, in prognosis
when we know the p(OjF) and the p(Oj:F) but are relatively un-
certain as to which groupdF vs. :Fdthe patient belongs, we can
calculate the probability of the outcome according to the formula
for total probability: p(O) ¼ p(OjF)p(F) þ p(Oj:F)p(:F). This model
may be useful when we lack a definitive diagnostic inference that
can decide whether the patient is F or :Fda not uncommon sce-
nario. Diagnostic tests often lack sensitivity (given a negative result
we are not confident that the patient lacks the disease) or speci-
ficity (given a positive result we are not confident that patient has
the disease). But from the negative or positive finding and the re-
ported sensitivity or specificity we can calculate the probability
that they have the disease, p(F), and the probability that they do not
have the disease, p(:F). If we also know the outcome rates among
individuals with and without the disease, we can determine the
p(OjF) and the p(Oj:F), respectively. Finally, we can calculate the
patient’s prognosis, the p(O), from the total probability equation,
based on our current diagnostic evidence. We can then determine
whether they fall into a useful risk category for treatment purposes.
On the other hand, we saw that the standard model neglects
evidence for the probability of the outcome beyond the study
population from which it extrapolates. We might know that the
patient is an F and the p(OjF), but are well-advised to update our
probabilities in the light of further evidence or further features
particular to this patient (assuming that the evidence is credible).
We could choose to update our probabilities quantitatively and
formally, usingdfor instancedthe model of Bayesian con-
ditionalization sometimes used in diagnosis. The Framingham Risk
Scale tells us the probability of a CVD event given a set of risk
factors ‘F’, the p(OjF). We might additionally learn that the patient
has a family history of CVD in a first-degree relative, ‘H’, and may
wish to revise the probability of a CVD event accordingly, since
patients with a family history of CVD are more likely to have CVD
themselves. Bayes’ Theorem tells us that p(OjH) ¼ [p(HjO)p(O)]/
p(H). We can treat the risk of CVD among patients with risk factors
‘F’ as the base rate or prior probability of CVD, p(O).We can then use
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having a family history of CVD among patients with CVD, p(HjO), as
well as the probability of having family history of CVD in general,
p(H). Finally, we can calculate the probability that the patient will
have CVD given the new information that they have relevant family
history, the p(OjH), using Bayes’ Theorem.21
Other times, probabilities may be difficult to estimate; and be-
sides, physicians and patients might struggle to make meaning out
of the precise numbers. Thus, we might instead choose to update
our probabilities informally, or even qualitatively. We might expect
a patient’s magnitude of benefit from a treatment to be lower if
they are poor adherer to the treatment. We may not know exactly
howmuch lower it will be, but depending on our purposes, it might
still be useful to expect a lower risk reduction than inferred by Risk
GP. Among patients that achieve some reduction in LDL cholesterol
using statin therapy but fall short of evidence-based targets, we
might expect the relative risk to be higher than the 0.8 predicted
from trial evidence (less of a risk reduction). Thus, the reduction in
probability of CVD due to statin therapy will also be lower. Among
patients that achieve half of the recommended reduction in LDL
cholesterol, we might predict that the relative risk will be roughly
0.9 (half as many CVD events prevented). For the patient with an
untreated risk of 25%, this prediction suggests a reduction in
probability of CVD from 25% to 22.5%, compared to the reduction
from 25% to 20% predicted by Risk GP.
Considering that alternate models are possible, we should
question whether we need a standard model of prediction in
medicine, a strategy that seems to promote the inflexibility of
reasoningwe caution against. Medicinewould better accommodate
the context-sensitivity of its prediction activities if it were instead
standard to carry along a plurality of models and to match the
model to the circumstances. Unfortunately, authoritative medical
textbooks and guides that teach the gold standard of prediction fail
to mention many of the alternatives. Other models, such as
mechanistic reasoning and predicting from personal experience,
receive variable recognition and often scant exposition. Crucially,
because the standard model is ellipticaldits assumptions remain
largely unarticulated in standard practicedwe are often unable to
recognize when the model fails, are often unable to appreciate the
importance of alternate models, and often fail to take model
pluralism seriously. Yet when it comes to medical prediction, many
models are surely better than one.7. Conclusion
‘Prediction’ refers to prediction activities as well as prediction
claims, broadly construed to cover unknown events and outcomes,
or narrowly construed to cover only future events and outcomes. In
medicine, narrow predictions are made in prognosis and treatment,
while broad predictions are made in diagnosis. Induction from
experience is one rational approach to prediction used throughout
medical history from at least the time of Hippocrates. It matured
with the ascent of epidemiology and statistics, giving rise to the
Risk GeneralizationeParticularization Model, the standard
approach to prediction in contemporary medicine. The general-
ization involves extrapolating a risk measure (either the absolute
risk or the effect size) from a study population to a target popula-
tion, while the particularization involves probabilizing the risk
measure for a patient from the target population.21 Guidelines for CVD risk assessment instruct physicians to double the risk
computed by the Framingham scale when CVD is present in a first-degree relative
younger than age 60 (Genest et al., 2009), which is good advice if the p(HjO)/p(H) is
roughly equal to 2.The standard model is not without its troubles. Risk GP models
medical prediction incompletely; further assumptions are needed
in place of the ellipses. First, generalization requires a representa-
tiveness or sufficient similarity assumption. Unfortunately, in
treatment the effect size may not generalize widely due to our
unrepresentative efficacy studies. Moreover, the conditions for
sound extrapolation are poorly articulated in standard practice,
resulting in an overly elliptical generalization scheme. Meanwhile,
particularization depends upon two assumptions. The first
assumption, that the patient under consideration is a member of
the reference population, is questionable whenever there is sig-
nificant diagnostic uncertainty. The second assumption, that the
probability of being assessed is the same for each patient, is
tenuous in the case of perhaps our most natural target populations.
Finally, standard particularization is frequently not particular
enough, failing to consider further features that locate the patient
in a narrower informative reference class. There are of course other
models of prediction we could use. Rather than inflexibly
committing ourselves to one standard model, it should be standard
to embrace model pluralism in medical prediction.Acknowledgements
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